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Abstract  Targeted tariffs are a common tool used by importing countries to protect
domestic fish producers. Unfortunately, such tariffs, in general, are ineffectual. The
reason is twofold. First, fish tend to be homogenous across supply sources, which
means a tariff on one supply source acts as an implicit import subsidy to other sup-
ply sources. Second, source-specific import shares tend to be small, which means
that the import demand elasticity is large, both absolutely and in relation to the im-
port supply elasticity. As a consequence, most of the tariff is borne by foreign
producers rather than domestic consumers. Indeed, analysis of a $0.50/lb. tariff on
catfish imports from Vietnam indicates that the tariff would increase the US price by
at most $0.17/lb. in the short run and $0.11/lb. in the long run. In light of this, and
the potential for retaliation, a better policy option may be market promotion. To ex-
amine this, an expression is developed to indicate the optimal promotion levy.
Applying the expression to catfish, results suggest that a levy of between 2% and 4%
on imports would be optimal in the sense that the induced promotion expenditure
would maximize foreign producer surplus. As a bonus, domestic producer surplus
would increase in that spending levels more nearly match the economic optimum.
Key words  Anti-dumping, Dorfman-Steiner theorem, generic advertising,
tariffs, tax incidence.
JEL Classification Codes  D4, F1, Q17.
Introduction
Thanks to an expanding, export-oriented aquacultural sector and international agree-
ments that have inter alia restricted access to coastal fisheries (Anderson and Fong
1997), some 40% of world fish production now enters international trade (Dommen
1999). One result has been growing protectionism (Wessells 1998). Recent examples
from the US include 4% to 7% and 15% to 31% countervailing duties on salmon imports
from Chile and Norway, and a 91% to 200% duty on crawfish imports from China (Rob-
erts 2002; Wilson 2000). At issue in this article is not the merits of the rulings that led to
these tariffs, rather their economic logic. In particular, the reason for imposing the tariffs
is to assist domestic producers by raising the domestic price. However, a targeted tariff’s
ability to accomplish this is dubious, as is clear from elementary trade theory.1 Given
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1 Empirical evidence is not inconsistent with theory. For example, in his analysis of the salmon tariff, Asche
(2001, p. 354) concludes: “the anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Norwegian salmon did not benefit
US farmers to any extent, but only led to other producers taking over Norwegian salmon market share.” With
respect to crawfish, Roberts (2002, p. 1) states: “[t]he tariff remedy had limited impact.” Brester, Marsh, and
Smith (2002) reach similar conclusions with respect to a US tariff on Canadian slaughter cattle. For a cogent
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the large sums spent litigating the cases, and the high costs of monitoring compli-
ance with what amounts to an ineffectual policy, this theory should be revisited.
The purpose of this research is to determine the effects of a targeted tariff on the
US catfish industry. Catfish is a useful case study in that a rapid rise in imports from
Vietnam (see table 1) has led to intense lobbying for a protective tariff (Cooper
2001). In addition, sufficient econometric analysis has been conducted to gain a
sense of the magnitudes of key elasticities that govern a tariff’s impact. Catfish is
similar to salmon and crawfish in that product differentiation is weak. As well, the
tariff under consideration is targeted rather than general. Hence, results for catfish
are applicable to crawfish and salmon. As a byproduct of the analysis, I consider the
spillover effects of a targeted tariff on imports from non-targeted sources, an issue
that has received relatively little attention. The analysis concludes with consider-
ation of a policy alternative: namely, market promotion.
In the next section I present the model and basic results. The model is then
simulated to determine the effects of a hypothetical $0.50/lb. tariff against Vietnam-
ese imports on the US price. I then discuss a tariff cum promotion as an alternative
to a straight tariff. The paper concludes with a summary of key findings.
Analysis
Prior to model specification, a review of the catfish “trade war” is in order. Before
1999, catfish imports accounted for less than 2% of domestic consumption and thus
were a non-issue. However, starting in 1997 imports from Vietnam began to grow at
an exponential rate, so that by 1999 Vietnam had supplanted Brazil and Guyana as
the top exporters to the US. Indeed, Vietnam’s share of the US frozen fillet market
increased from 1.6% to 13% between 1999 and 2001 (table 1). That this growth was
price driven appears undeniable. In particular, the price of Vietnamese catfish be-
tween 1999 and 2001 dropped from $2.04/lb. to $1.26/lb., while the US price held
steady at about $2.73/lb.2 This price advantage increased Vietnam’s import share
relative to its international competitors, particularly Brazil. However, most of the
growth appears to have occurred at the expense of US producers. One indicator is
that despite steady domestic production levels between 2000 and 2001, the US fro-
zen fillet price dropped from $2.83/lb. to $2.61/lb., and the farm price dropped from
$0.75/lb. to $0.64/lb. (table 1).
In response, the domestic industry adopted a three-pronged strategy (Cooper
2001). First, it sought legislation to require that catfish imported from Vietnam be
labeled. Second, it lobbied for renegotiation of the Vietnam-US trade agreement
(ratified by Congress in October 2001) to set limits on catfish imports. Third, it filed
an anti-dumping petition with the US International Trade Commission (USITC) as a
first step toward a tariff and import quotas. The first prong has met with some suc-
cess (Brasher 2001); the second is doubtful; and the third is pending (Davis 2002).3
At issue here is the efficacy of a tariff, should the third prong prove successful.
To that end, I adopt an equilibrium displacement modeling approach similar to the
2 The price advantage enjoyed by Vietnam has been ascribed to quality differences. This has been diffi-
cult to document. What seems clear is that production costs are at work. Specifically, Pangasius
hypophthalmus, the main catfish species believed to be imported from Vietnam (WorldCatch 2001), at-
tains market weight in 6 to 8 months (Jepsen 2000). This compares to a year or longer for Ictalurus
punctatus, the species grown in the US.
3 A preliminary determination of dumping was issued by the US Department of Commerce in January
2003. A final determination, which provides for the imposition of duties, is expected in late July or early
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one used by Kinnucan and Myrland (2002) to analyze the effects of the Norway-EU
salmon agreement. The model herein focuses on the frozen fillet market, since most
imports from Vietnam are in that product form. A key assumption is that frozen cat-
fish fillets are undifferentiated across supply sources, an assumption consistent with
industry efforts to secure mandatory labeling. In addition, we assume that domestic
and international markets are sufficiently integrated such that the Law of One Price
(LOP) holds. The US is assumed to be a “large-nation” importer with respect to
Vietnam; hence, changes in US import demand influence the Vietnamese price.
With these assumptions, the basic model is as follows:
D = D(PUS) (US demand) (1)
S = S(PUS) (US supply) (2)
MV = M(PV) (US imports from Vietnam) (3)
MR = M(PUS) (US imports from ROW) (4)
PUS = PV + TV (US price) (5)
D = S + MV + MR (US market clearing) (6)
where D and S represent domestic consumption and production, respectively; MV
and MR represent US imports from Vietnam and Rest-of-World (ROW), respectively;
PUS is domestic price inclusive of the (hypothetical) per-unit tariff TV; and PV is the
Vietnamese price exclusive of the tariff. Note that since the tariff is applied only to
Vietnamese imports, ROW exporters to the US respond to PUS, which is higher than
Table 1
Imports, Production, and Prices, US Catfish Industry, 1998–2001
Value
Variable Definition 1998 1999 2000 2001
MV Imports from Vietnam (mil. lbs.) 0.6 2.0 7.0 17.1
MR Imports from Rest-of-World (ROW) (mil. lbs.) 0.8 1.4 1.2 1.0
S US production of frozen fillets (mil. lbs.) 113.5 120.0 119.7 115.0
X US exports of frozen fillets (mil. lbs.) 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.2
D US consumption (= MV + MR + S – X) 114.6 123.2 127.3 132.9
kV Vietnam’s quantity share (= MV/D) 0.005 0.016 0.055 0.129
kR ROW’s quantity share (= MR/D) 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.008
kUS US’s quantity share (= S/D) 0.990 0.974 0.940 0.865
PV Vietnam price ($/lb.)a 2.01 2.04 1.52 1.26
PUS US frozen fillet price ($/lb.) 2.69 2.76 2.83 2.61
QF Farm production (live weight, mil. lbs.) 564 597 594 597
PF Farm price (¢/lb.) 74.2 73.7 75.0 64.5
QW Wholesale quantity, all products (mil. lbs.) 281 293 297 296
PW Wholesale price, all products ($/lb.) 2.31 2.34 2.38 2.25
Source: USDA, ERS (2002); Crews (2002).
a FOB price Vietnam. Shipping cost to the US is estimated to be about $0.50/lb.Kinnucan 214
PV. Thus, the tariff provides an implicit subsidy to ROW producers who have access
to the US market.
The model contains six endogenous variables (PUS, PV, D, S, MV, and MR) and
one exogenous variable (TV). We implicitly assume that frozen fillets are strictly
separable from all other goods, at least as a first approximation. Exogenous vari-
ables that affect supply and demand other than the tariff are suppressed. United
States exports of catfish are negligible (see table 1), and thus ignored, as they com-
plicate the analysis without having any material effect on results.
Comparative Statics
To determine the tariff’s effect on the US price, we first express the model in log
differential form as follows:
D* = –h US PUS
* (1¢)
S* = eUS P US
* (2¢)
MV
* = ¢  e  V P V
* (3¢)
MR
* = ¢  e RPUS
* (4¢)
P US
* = (1 - tV )P V
* + tVTV
* (5¢)
D* = kUSS* + kVMV
* + k RM R
*, (6¢)
where the asterisked variables refer to relative changes (e.g.,  P US
*  = dln(PUS) = dPUS/PUS);
hUS is the domestic demand elasticity for frozen fillets in absolute value; eUS is the
domestic supply elasticity;  ¢  e  V  and  ¢  e R  are import supply elasticities; kUS (= S/D) is
the US quantity share; ki (= Mi/D) i = V, R are import shares for Vietnam and ROW,
respectively; and tV = TV/PUS < 1 is the relative tax rate; i.e., the per-unit tax divided
by the US price in initial equilibrium. In this study, different notation is used for do-
mestic (eUS) and import supply elasticities ( ¢  e  V  and  ¢  e R ) to reflect the fact that the
latter include responses of consumers as well as producers in the respective export-
ing countries.
The tariff’s effect on the US price is determined by solving equations (1¢) – (6¢)
simultaneously for  P US





w = kV ¢  e  V kV ¢  e  V + (1 - t V )(hUS + kUSeUS + k R ¢  e  R) [ ]. (8)
Noting that tV = TV/PUS, equation (7) can be expressed more simply as:
dPUS = wdTV. (7a)Futility of Targeted Fish Tariffs and an Alternative 215
For normal parameter values w < 1. Hence, from expression (7a) a one dollar in-
crease in the tariff always causes the US price to rise by less than one dollar. The
reason for this is clear from equation (8): a tariff-induced rise in the US price dis-
courages domestic consumption (hUS parameter), encourages domestic production
(eUS parameter), and encourages increased imports from the untaxed source ( ¢  e R  pa-
rameter). Any one these factors weakens the tariff’s price effect. That all three work
in tandem highlights the difficulty. For example, Brazil or Guyana could easily redi-
rect its exports from (say) Europe to the US in response to a tariff-induced rise in
US price. Moreover, the incentive to do so is strong, as the tariff simultaneously raises
price in the US market and lowers price in ROW markets. This implies that  ¢  e R  is quite
large. In the limit where  ¢  e R  = ¥, w = 0 and the tariff has no effect on US price. This,
in essence, is the analytical case for believing that targeted tariffs are futile. It pro-
vides theoretical support for Asche’s (2001) and Brester, Marsh, and Smith’s (2002)
empirical findings that targeted tariffs do little to assist US producers.
Tariff Incidence
Further insight can be gained by deriving the expression for tariff incidence. For this
purpose, we delete equation (3¢) (since we want to treat PV as temporarily exog-
enous) and solve the remaining equations simultaneously for  M V





* = - ¢  h  VPV
* - tV (1 - tV ) [ ] ¢  h  VT V
*, (9)
where:
¢  h  V = (1 - tV )(hUS + kUSeUS + kR ¢  e  R) kV
(9a)
is the US demand elasticity with respect to imports from Vietnam. From equation
(9) the import demand curve is downward sloping ( – ¢  h  V  < 0), and an increase in the
tariff shifts the curve to the left ([–tV/(1 – tV)] ¢  h  V  < 0), as expected. More to the
point, equation (9a) indicates that the import demand curve becomes more elastic as:
(i) domestic consumers or producers become more sensitive to price (larger hUS or
eUS), (ii) Vietnam’s international competitors become more sensitive to price in their
allocation of supplies to the US market (larger  ¢  e R ); and (iii) US reliance on Vietnam
as a supply source decreases (smaller kV). In particular,  ¢  h  V  ® ¥ as kV ® 0, which
reflects the well-known “small-nation” trader effect. Since the tariff simultaneously
contracts kV and expands kR and kUS, it enlarges  ¢  h  V , which further undermines the
tariff’s efficacy, as will become apparent.
Substituting equation (9a) into equation (8) yields:
w = ¢  e  V ( ¢  e  V + ¢  h  V ) , (8¢)
which is the familiar tax incidence relation. Specifically, expression (8¢) indicates
the extent to which the tariff is borne by US consumers as opposed to Vietnamese
producers. A small value for w implies that  ¢  h  V  is large in relation to  ¢  e  V . One way
this can occur is if  ¢  e R  is large, as has been discussed. Another way is if kV is small,
as is true in the present case (kV < 0.13), and would be true generally when the tariff
is targeted and supply from the targeted source constitutes a small fraction of do-
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Effects of a $0.50 Tariff on US Price
To demonstrate the foregoing ideas and provide information germane to the current
policy debate, we “simulate” equation (8¢) to determine the effects of a hypothetical
$0.50/lb. tariff on US price. This tariff approximates the lower-bound dumping
charges contemplated in the Commerce Department’s preliminary determination.
The implied shift in the excess supply curve (about 22% in the price direction based
on 2001 data values) is outside the 10% limit suggested by Piggott (1992, p. 133)
for equilibrium displacement modeling. Thus, some caution is required in interpret-
ing results in that approximation errors grow with the size of the displacement.4 In
the simulations, the ki parameters are set to their 2001 values as given in table 1.
Domestic supply and demand elasticities are taken from the literature. In particular,
hUS is set alternatively to 0.71, 1.42, and 2.13. The 0.71 value is based on Kinnucan
and Miao’s (1999) estimate of hUS for all catfish products. Since demand for frozen
fillets is likely to be more price elastic than the demand for all catfish, hUS = 0.71 is
taken as a lower-bound estimate, and the elasticity is doubled and tripled to provide
a plausible range. The domestic supply elasticity, eUS, is set to 0.73, Zidack,
Kinnucan, and Hatch’s (1992) long-run estimate of this parameter measured at the
farm level. Although eUS refers to a wholesale-level elasticity, the parameter values
at the two market levels should be similar, since raw fish is a constraining input in
processing. To analyze short-run effects, we set eUS = 0, Zidack, Kinnucan, and
Hatch’s estimate for a time horizon of approximately 16 months.
No empirical estimates exist for  ¢  e  V  and  ¢  e R . Intuitively, these elasticities might
be larger than eUS (a domestic supply elasticity), as the  ¢  e  i  are import t supply elastici-
ties and thus reflect consumer as well as producer responses to price within the
respective exporting countries. Moreover, we expect  ¢  e R  to be larger than  ¢  e  V , since
the former elasticity reflects a diversionary effect. That is, an increase in the tariff
on Vietnamese imports simultaneously raises the US price and lowers the ROW
price. Since non-Vietnamese exporters are not subject to the tariff, they have a
double incentive to redirect exports to the US market, as discussed earlier. Hence,
we assume  ¢  e  V  Î [1, 3] and  ¢  e R  Î [2, 10], where the lower limits correspond to short-
run elasticities. Since, at present, imports enter duty free, we set tV = 0.
Results
Results indicate that for the considered parameter values, a $0.50/lb. tariff on Vietnam-
ese imports would cause the US price to rise by at most $0.17 in the short run and $0.11
in the long run (table 2). Stated differently, the US’s incidence of the tariff is at most
34% in the short run and 22% in the long run. Incidence is lower in the long run because
an increase in eUS causes import demand to become more elastic in relation to import
supply [see equation (9a)], which means more of the tax is borne by the foreign supplier.
The mean price rise is between $0.047 and $0.115 for short-run simulations and between
$0.031 and $0.082 for long-run simulations. The middle value for the long-run effect is
$0.058. Taking this as a “best-bet” estimate, it appears that only about 12% of the tariff
will appear as a rise in the US price once markets have fully adjusted. Hence, the tariff
in essence punishes Vietnamese exporters with little reward for US producers.
4 If the supply shift is measured using an integrated market model, the vertical displacement is much
smaller, on the order of 2.8% (= 22% x Vietnam’s share of domestic consumption (0.128)). Thus, ap-
proximation error computed on the basis of the shift in the excess supply curve may be more apparent
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Sensitivity Analysis
The foregoing results are insensitive to  ¢  e R  (since kR is tiny), but quite sensitive to
¢  e  V . Since US consumer incidence rises with  ¢  e  V , it is important that  ¢  e  V  not be un-
derstated to prejudice results against the tariff. To investigate this issue, let:
QX + QUS + QNUS,
where QX is Vietnam’s total exports of catfish, QUS is Vietnam’s exports to the US
market, and QNUS is Vietnam’s exports to non-US markets. Taking the derivative of
this expression with respect to PV yields:
¶QX ¶P V = ¶QUS ¶PV + ¶QNUS ¶PV .
Multiplying this expression through by PV/QX yields:
eS = (QUS QX ) ¢  e  V + (QNUS QX ) ¢  e  NUS, (10)
where  eS [=  (¶QX/¶PV)(PV/QX)]  is  Vietnam’s  total  excess  supply  elasticity,
¢  e  V  [= (¶QUS/¶PV)(PV/QUS)] is an elasticity that tells how a change in the Vietnamese
price affects Vietnam’s exports to the US market, and  ¢  e NUS  [= (¶QNUS/¶PV)(PV/QNUS)] is
an elasticity that tells how a change in the Vietnamese price affects Vietnam’s ex-
Table 2
Effect of a $0.50 Tariff Against Vietnamese Imports on US Price
Short Run (eUS = 0) Long Run (eUS = 0.73)
Parameter Value ¢  e  V  = 1 ¢  e  V  = 2 ¢  e  V  = 3 ¢  e  V  = 1   ¢  e  V  = 2 ¢  e  V  = 3
(————————————— (¢/lb.) —————————————)
hUS = 0.71
¢  e  R  = 10 6.9 12.1 16.2 4.1 7.6 10.6
¢  e  R  = 8 7.0 12.3 16.4 4.2 7.7 10.7
¢  e  R  = 4 7.2 12.6 16.8 4.2 7.8 10.9
¢  e  R  = 2 7.4 12.8 17.1 4.3 7.9 11.0
hUS = 1.42
¢  e  R  = 10 4.0 7.3 10.3 2.9 5.4 7.7
¢  e  R  = 8 4.0 7.4 10.3 2.9 5.4 7.7
¢  e  R  = 4 4.1 7.5 10.5 2.9 5.5 7.8
¢  e  R  = 2 4.1 7.6 10.6 2.9 5.5 7.9
hUS = 2.13
¢  e  R  = 10 2.8 5.2 7.5 2.2 4.2 6.0
¢  e  R  = 8 2.8 5.3 7.5 2.2 4.2 6.0
¢  e  R  = 4 2.8 5.3 7.6 2.2 4.2 6.1
¢  e  R  = 2 2.8 5.4 7.6 2.2 4.3 6.1
Mean Value 4.7 8.4 11.5 3.1 5.8 8.2
Based on equation (8¢). See text for details.Kinnucan 218
ports to non-US markets. From equation (10), the total excess supply elasticity is a
quantity-share weighted average of the market-specific elasticities. In the trivial
case where Vietnam exports only to the US (QNUS = 0), the total and US-specific
elasticities are identical; i.e., eS =  ¢  e  V .
More generally, the relationship between eS and  ¢  e  V  is defined as:
¢  e  V - eS = (QNUS QX )( ¢  e  V - ¢  e  NUS).
From this expression,  ¢  e  V  may be larger or smaller than eS depending on the relative
magnitudes of  ¢  e  V  and  ¢  e NUS . Intuitively, Vietnam’s propensity to export to alterna-
tive markets should be related to those markets’ proximity. According to best
estimates, Vietnam’s catfish exports are distributed as follows: 50% to US, 23% to
Asia, 15% to Europe, and 12% to ROW (Crews 2002). With this in mind, it is not
unreasonable to suppose that  ¢  e  V  =  ¢  e NUS , in which case  ¢  e  V  = eS.
The issue then reduces to eS’s magnitude. By definition (see Houck 1986, p. 34):
eS = (QS QX)eV + (QD QX)h V,
where QS and QD are Vietnam’s domestic production and consumption of catfish, re-
spectively; eV is Vietnam’s domestic supply elasticity for catfish; and hV is
Vietnam’s domestic demand elasticity in absolute value. Based on best estimates,
90% of Vietnam’s production is exported (Crews 2002). This implies:
eS = 1.11 eV + 0.11hV ,
which, upon substituting eV = 0.73 and hV = 1.42 (best-bet US values) yields eS =  ¢  e  V
= 0.96. Since the values used for  ¢  e  V  in table 2 are above 0.96, there appears little
danger that the results are prejudiced against the tariff. In fact, results for  ¢  e  V  > 1
should be conservative in this regard.5
The results in table 2 are based on the assumption that the ki parameters are
fixed constants. In reality, the tariff would shrink kV and expand kR and kUS. Taking
this endogeneity into account puts the tariff in an even worse light than indicated in
table 2. This is demonstrated in table 3 where we have simulated  ¢  h  V  and w for alter- -
native values of kV holding kR constant at its 2001 value,  ¢  e R  constant at 4, and hUS
constant at 1.42. As can be seen,  ¢  h  V  increases steadily with decreases in kV, which
causes w to decline. For example, a reduction in kV from 0.129 (its 2001 value) to
0.06 would cause  ¢  h  V  to increase from 11 to 24 in the short run and from 16 to 36 in
the long run. Focusing on the long-run result, the associated reduction in US inci-
dence is from 16% to 8%. Thus, if the tariff were successful in cutting Vietnam’s
import share by this magnitude, the results in table 2 would overstate the tariff’s im-
pact by 50%. Combining this result with the results for the  ¢  e  V  parameter, it appears
safe to say that table 2 overstates rather than understates potential impacts.
5 In essence, Vietnam is less important to the US as a trading partner than vice versa. As a result, it is
easier for the US to find alternative supply sources in response to a rise in the Vietnamese price than for
Vietnam to find new markets. This explains why  ¢  e  V  is small in relation to  ¢  h  V . That is, in trade theory
parlance, the monopoly/monopsony power balance favors the US (see Syropoulos 2002).Futility of Targeted Fish Tariffs and an Alternative 219
Win-Win Solution
Given the tariff’s limited effect on US price, and its potential to undermine the US’s
credibility as a free-trade advocate, better alternatives must exist. One possibility is
market promotion. Specifically, imports could be taxed with the proceeds used to
conduct generic advertising. This is the approach taken in the salmon trade dispute
between Norway and the European Union (Bull and Brittan 1997). In addition to be-
ing consistent with a free-trade posture, promotion can be “win-win” in that
domestic and foreign producers alike can benefit (Kinnucan and Myrland 2002,
2003). In instances where the domestic industry already supports generic advertis-
ing, a “promotion tax” on imports can be justified in that it eliminates free riding. In
the catfish case, promotion is currently funded via a voluntary $5/ton assessment on
catfish feed. This generates an annual budget of about $4 million, which is equiva-
lent to 0.6% of wholesale value. Research suggests that program intensification
would increase domestic producer surplus (Kinnucan and Paudel 2001). Hence, by
extending the promotion “tax” to include imports, it should be possible to increase
the economic surplus of domestic as well as foreign producers.
Optimal Levy
Foreign producers’ incentive to invest in domestic market promotion can be assessed
with appropriate modifications to the model. First, we include an advertising vari-
able in the domestic demand equation as follows:
D * = -hPUS
* + aA*, (1a¢)
where a is the advertising elasticity and A* is the relative change in advertising ex-
penditure. Next, we define tax revenue (= advertising expenditure) as:
A = TM × M,
Table 3
Relationship Between Import Share, Import Demand Elasticity, and US Incidence of Tariff
Demand Elasticity ( ¢  h  V )a Incidence (w)b
Import Share
(kV) Short Run Long Run Short Run Long Run
0.129 11.3 16.1 0.08 0.16
0.12 12.1 17.4 0.08 0.15
0.10 14.5 21.0 0.06 0.12
0.08 18.2 26.5 0.05 0.10
0.06 24.2 35.5 0.04 0.08
0.04 36.3 53.7 0.03 0.05
0.02 72.6 108.1 0.01 0.03
a Based on formula  ¢  h  V  = (hUS + kUS eUS + kR  ¢  e  R )/kV with hUS = 1.42,  ¢  e  R  = 4, kR = 0.008, and kUS = 1 – kR – kV.
The eUS parameter is set to zero for the short-run simulations and to 0.73 for the long-run simulations.
b Based on formula w =  ¢  e  V /( ¢  e  V  +  ¢  h  V ), where  ¢  e  V  = 1 for short run and  ¢  e  V  = 3 for long run.Kinnucan 220
where M = MV + MR is total imports and TM is the per-unit promotion tax. Taking the





where kV = MV/M and kR = MR/M. Since the tax is against all imports, we replace the
V subscripts in equation (5¢) with M. Since ROW exporters are now taxed along with
Vietnamese exporters in equation (4¢), we set  P US
*  equal to  P M
*, where  P M
* is defined
as the change in “net price;” i.e., the US price exclusive of the promotion levy.
With these modifications, the key question from Vietnam and ROW suppliers’ per-
spective is the extent to which the promotion can increase the net price.6 To determine
this, we solve equations (1a¢), (2¢) – (6¢), and (11) simultaneously for  P M
*  to yield:
PM
* = a - h + kUSeUS ( )t M [ ] L { }TM
* , (12)
where L is a complex expression of no interest here except to note that its sign is
positive for normal parameter values. From equation (12), whether or not an in-
crease in the tax increases the net price is ambiguous. In particular, in the short run
where eUS = 0,  P M
* T M
*  > 0 only if a > h tM, i.e.; the advertising effect exceeds the
tax effect. Since the tax and the advertising have opposite effects on net price, this
result is intuitive. In fact, to maximize foreign producer surplus, TM should be in-
creased to the point where the supply shift associated with the tax just cancels the
demand shift associated with the advertising so that  P M
* T M
*  = 0 (see Kinnucan and
Myrland 2000 and references cited therein). In terms of equation (12), this condition
implies:
tM
o = a (h + kUSeUS) , (13)
where  tM
o  is the optimal tax rate; i.e., the optimal per-unit tax expressed as a frac-
tion of PUS. From equation (13), foreign producers’ incentive to invest in domestic
market promotion increases as: (i) advertising’s ability to shift the domestic demand
curve increases (larger a), (ii) domestic consumers or producers become less sensi-
tive to price (smaller h or eUS), and (iii) exporters’ domestic consumption share
increases (smaller kUS).7
Condition (13) indicates the tax rate that maximizes foreign producer surplus
when the tax rate on domestic production (= 0.6%) is held constant. If the tax rate
on domestic production is permitted to vary, a global condition can be derived that
indicates the “best” tax rate for domestic and foreign producers combined. That con-
dition is:
to = a h, (14)
6 A reviewer questioned how introduction of PM into the model handles the wedge between the Vietnam-
ese and US price, which motivated the dumping tariff in the first place. The answer is that the wedge
will remain, as promotion, if effective, will cause a generalized rise in the US price. But the crucial
question is not whether promotion can eliminate the wedge, but whether the net benefit to US producers
is higher. That, in turn, depends upon which instrument, a targeted tariff or a smaller generalized tariff
cum promotion, has a larger effect on the US price.
7 Equation (13) is a new result in the commodity promotion literature. Specifically, Freebairn and
Alston’s (2001, table 1) summary of optimality conditions contains no result for the net importer case.
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which is the familiar Dorfman-Steiner theorem (Dorfman and Steiner 1954). Equa-
tion (14) indicates a higher tax rate than (13) because the free-rider problem is
eliminated. That is, with a uniform tax on domestic production and imports, neither
group gains an advantage from the promotion scheme. This increases each group’s
incentive to contribute to the program, as the tax is deemed “fair.”8
Simulation
With the foregoing in mind, we simulated equations (13) and (14) for alternative pa-
rameter values as indicated in table 4. The advertising elasticity is varied along the
interval a Î [0.005, 0.050], which contains Zidack, Kinnucan, and Hatch’s (1992)
estimate of 0.0066 and Kinnucan and Miao’s (1999) more recent estimate of 0.0244.
These estimates indicate the demand shift for all catfish without regard to product
form. Since not all imported catfish are frozen fillets, and to keep the analysis gen-
eral, h is interpreted as pertaining to all catfish, not just frozen fillets. As
mentioned, Kinnucan and Miao’s (1999) point estimate of this parameter is 0.71. To
indicate sensitivity of results to the demand elasticity, h is increased and decreased
by 50% from its baseline value.9 The supply elasticity in equation (13) is set to eUS =
8 Conditions (13) and (14) are incomplete in that we have not considered the case where foreign produc-
ers are permitted to free ride. In this case, the optimal levy from the domestic producer perspective is
t D
o
 = a/(h + kM  ¢  e  M ), where kM is import share and  ¢  e  M  is the import supply elasticity. Since  t D
o
 < to, the
interpretation is symmetric with respect to the “fairness” issue.
9 One might argue that h overstates price sensitivity in that demand interrelationships are not taken into
account (Buse 1958). However, as shown by Kinnucan (1996), ignoring demand interrelationships
would also tend to cause a to be overstated. Since a and h enter the optimality conditions as a ratio,
substitution effects tend to be self-cancelling.
Table 4
Optimal Advertising Levy on Imported Catfish
With Free Riding (tM
o ) Without Free Riding (to)
Advertising
Elasticity (a) h = 0.36 h = 0.71 h = 1.06 h = 0.36 h = 0.71 h = 1.06
0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.014 0.007 0.005
0.010 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.028 0.014 0.009
0.015 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.042 0.021 0.014
0.020 0.019 0.014 0.011 0.056 0.028 0.019
0.025 0.024 0.018 0.014 0.070 0.035 0.023
0.030 0.029 0.021 0.017 0.085 0.042 0.028
0.035 0.034 0.025 0.020 0.099 0.049 0.033
0.040 0.038 0.029 0.023 0.113 0.056 0.038
0.045 0.043 0.032 0.026 0.127 0.063 0.042
0.050 0.048 0.036 0.029 0.141 0.070 0.047
Mean Value ( t ) 0.028 0.021 0.016 0.077 0.039 0.026
Added Promotion
Budget (mil. $)a 1.14 0.83 0.66 3.15 1.58 1.05
a Computed as  t  · PUS · M, where PUS = $2.25/lb. and M = (MV + MR) = 18.1 million lbs. (see table 1).
The current promotion budget is about $4.0 million.
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0.73, the value consistent with the long-run simulations presented in tables 2 and 3.
Since imported catfish accounted for 6% of total processed volume in 2001 (= [(MV
+ MR)/QW] x 100, see table 1), we set kUS = 0.94.
Focusing first on the situation where the domestic levy is held constant, the op-
timal levy on imports, evaluated at mean advertising responses, is between 1.6% and
2.8%. This levy generates between $0.66 million and $1.14 million in additional
funds. At existing funding levels, these monies would expand promotion by between
17% and 28%.
If the levy on domestic production is changed in tandem with the levy on im-
ports so that neither group free rides, the optimal import levy increases to between
2.6% and 7.7%. In this case, the budget is enlarged by between $1.1 million and
$3.2 million, a significant increase over the current budget of $4 million. Thus, requiring
domestic producers to contribute at the same rate as foreign producers significantly
enhances foreign producers’ incentive to participate in the marketing effort. Al-
though domestic producers may be unwilling to go along with a rate hike, clearly it
is advantageous to both groups that imports be assessed. The results in table 4 pro-
vide a basis for determining what that assessment should be when the goal is to
maximize foreign producer surplus. Taking h = 0.71 as the best-bet overall demand
elasticity, the optimal levy on imports would appear to be in the 2% to 4% range.
Concluding Comments
This study uses an equilibrium displacement model to assess the efficacy of targeted
tariffs as a policy tool to assist domestic fish producers. Results indicate that such
tariffs are problematic in that import demand from a particular supply source tends
to be highly price elastic, both absolutely and in relation to import supply from that
source. As a consequence, most of the tariff’s burden is borne by that particular
country’s foreign producers rather than domestic consumers. A related problem is
that a targeted tariff stimulates imports from non-taxed supply sources, which fur-
ther undermines the tariff’s ability to raise domestic price. It is not surprising,
therefore, that empirical evidence provides little support for the hypothesis that tar-
geted tariffs benefit US producers (Asche 2001; Brester, Marsh, and Smith 2002).
Indeed, model simulations suggest that a $0.50/lb. tariff on US catfish imports from
Vietnam would do more to punish Vietnamese producers than to reward US produc-
ers.
Given that targeted tariffs are a priori ineffectual, costly to implement, and in-
vite retaliation, better alternatives must exist. One possibility is market promotion.
Market promotion is an attractive alternative in that it can be “win-win;” i.e., benefit
domestic and foreign producers alike. Exploring this option, we find that foreign
producers’ incentive to invest in domestic market promotion is identical to domestic
producers’ incentive, provided both groups are assessed at the same rate. Applying
this principle to catfish and utilizing recent estimates of promotion and price re-
sponses, study results suggest the optimal “promotion tax” on imports is in the range
of 2% to 4%.10
A caveat in interpreting our results is that we have focused strictly on producer
impacts. If the goal is to maximize national welfare (= tariff receipts plus domestic
10 Another alternative, suggested by my colleague Henry Thompson, is a lump-sum “buy-out.” That is,
simply give every commercial producer a one-time payment of (say) $0.5 million with the understand-
ing that he/she must then accept import competition. This would avoid tariff-based dead weight losses,
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producer and consumer surplus), a targeted tariff might be preferred since foreign
producers bear most of the tariff’s incidence (Enke 1944). Advertising increases
consumer surplus if it provides useful information, or enhances product image; the
opposite is true if it is strictly persuasive (Tremblay and Tremblay 1995). Some con-
tend that generic advertising is more persuasive than informative (e.g., Crespi and
Marette 2002). Moreover, increased advertising for catfish might stimulate increased
promotion by competing fish producers, which could erode the effect of the initial
promotion increase. Still, if the goal is to assist domestic producers, promotion
would appear to have the edge as a policy instrument, as targeted tariffs are prob-
lematic both from theoretical and empirical perspectives.
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